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Flint: An
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The story of Flint—the
Michigan city in which
people were harmed by
drinking water that con-
tained lead and lethal
bacteria—is a warning to
all struggling US com-
munities that confront
disinvestment, declining
population, excessive fi-
nancial focus, incompe-
tent leadership, non-
transparent government,
and racism. Flint is also a
tale of a persevering com-
munity, gooddoctors andscientists, and
courage. The various facets of this story
were captured ably in two recent books:
What the Eyes Don’t See, by physician
Mona Hanna-Attisha, and The Poisoned
City, by journalist Anna Clark.
As cities and states go, Flint andMich-
igan could be considered all-American.
From the 1930s to the 1960s Flint’s av-
erage incomes were among the highest
in the country, thanks to a powerful
company (General Motors [GM]) and
the United Auto Workers union. The
Buick plant in Flint was at one time
the largest factory in the world, and
Michigan was critical to US production
needs in World War II. The automotive
industry had made many people in
Michigan wealthy and created a strong
middle class, though African Americans
did not fare as well as others. For exam-
ple, when GM built affordable worker
housing in Flint, blacks were mostly ex-
cluded, both Clark and Hanna-Attisha
report.
In the postwar era the movement of
more prosperous white people from
older cities to the suburbs was accelerat-
ed due to easy highway access, lower
taxes, cheap fossil fuels, and racism.
Meanwhile, the very limited housing
and job options for poor black people
fueled inner-city riots. Over the same
period, the auto companies—the eco-
nomic engine of the city—were closing
manufacturing plants and moving to
areas with lower material and labor
costs.
Flint’s population, which peaked
at 200,000 in 1960, was about 96,000
in 2017, according to Census Bureau
estimates. As the population declined,
tax revenues followed, while the state
also suffered shortfalls and reduced its
support for struggling cities. As Clark
writes, Flint was in deep deficit by
2011 when the State of Michigan Public
Act 4 enabled Gov. Rick Snyder to ap-
point a fiscally focused emergency man-
ager to prevent the city’s bankruptcy.
While Flint had an elected mayor and
council, sweeping powers were held by
the state-appointed emergency manag-
er, including “to reject, modify and ter-
minate contracts including union agree-
ments,” Clark writes. Other struggling
cities were in the same position. Accord-
ing to The Poisoned City, “by 2017 52 per-
cent of African Americans in Michigan
were being governed by an appointed
EmergencyManager”—in essence, their
votes in local elections were irrelevant—
whereas only 2 percent of white resi-
dents were so disenfranchised.
Michigan, nicknamed theGreat Lakes
State, is surrounded by one-fifth of the
world’s fresh water. Lake Huron sup-
plied excellent drinking water to cities
including Detroit and, beginning in
1964, Flint. Sixty percent of Flint’s water
was used by the auto plants. As Flint’s
population declined, the per household
costs of water service increased. In a city
where80percentof the residents earned
less than $40,000 a year and 40 percent
earned less than $15,000, the average
household cost for water and sewage
was over $1,500 per year. Flint was pay-
ing millions to Detroit to draw fresh wa-
ter from Lake Huron, treat it, and pipe
it to Flint. A half-century earlier, Flint
had had its own water treatment plant
on the nearby Flint River, and to save
money, the city decided to recommis-
sion it. Complicating this plan was the
need to upgrade the old plant, switch to
a newer (but more corrosive) chlora-
mine disinfection system, and hire addi-
tional water engineers. Flint neverthe-
less switched back to its river water in
2013. Soon, complaints began about the
water’s taste, odor, and color, and with-
in weeks people reported unpleasant ef-
fects such as skin rashes. The nearby
Chevrolet plant stopped using Flint
water because of its corrosive effects
on engine blocks. When water testing
was performed, Hanna-Attisha reports,
inspectors flushed cold water as long as
fifteen minutes to get contaminant lev-
els lower. The city and state said that the
samples they tookmet official standards
andassured everyone thewaterwas fine.
Hanna-Attisha was head of the pediat-
ric residency program at Flint’s Hurley
Medical Center and heard concerns
about the water from the new mothers
shewas caring for. As a pediatrician, she
knew that on a weight basis, infants
drink three to four times as much water
as adults, and that growing brains and
bodies were more sensitive to toxic ele-
ments such as lead. Lead damages many
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organs, and the damage to the develop-
ing brain can be lifelong. Many of
Hanna-Attisha’s patients were fed with
powdered infant formula, which is re-
constituted with tap water. On the basis
of the government reports, Hanna-
Attisha assured mothers that using for-
mula was safe.
However, she soon learned from a
close friend of the work of a groundwa-
ter regulations manager at the US Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Miguel
Del Toral. In an eight-page memo in
June 2015, Del Toral had warned about
health hazards from “high lead levels in
Flint.” The Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality did not respond,
Del Toral was reprimanded within the
EPA for overstepping his role, and an
ethics complaint was filed against him.
The lead levels in the water were high
because of something every water engi-
neer knows: Old pipes can leach lead
into water, especially when using chlo-
ramine disinfection. Failing to use cor-
rosion control compounds was engi-
neering malpractice, in my view. The
water was unfit to give to an infant or
anyone else, especially straight from the
tap. People do not run the tap for fifteen
minutes to get water when they are
thirsty or to cook, wash, or shower.
What the Eyes Don’t See records
Hanna-Attisha’s awakening to the dan-
ger of the water and the ineffectiveness
of the public health bureaucracy.When
she called the Genesee County Health
Department’s Childhood Lead Poison-
ingPreventionProgram(a statewide ini-
tiative) to report high levels of lead in
the water, she was told that water was
not their responsibility.When she asked
the state program that is mandated to
collect child blood lead test data for
Flint-specific data, she got a runaround.
When she was finally given a copy of a
one-page document, it seemed to show
no increase in Flint children’s blood lead
levels. She quickly realized that the
summary lumped together unequally
exposed people, diluting findings from
the most affected neighborhoods. She
recruited a colleague skilled in geo-
graphic information system technology
and found that blood lead levels were
indeed higher in certain blocks. She
was sleepless, exhausted, and “terri-
fied,” she writes, but she bravely an-
nounced her results at a press confer-
ence. Though she was initially accused
of “splicing and dicing” the data, the
findings were determined to be robust,
and Flint became a national story.
Anna Clark’s exquisitely documented
reporting in The Poisoned City is a pow-
erful complement to Hanna-Attisha’s
medical and personal odyssey. Just as
soldiers rarely understand the battles
in which they served until years later,
Clark’s historical eye delineates the
upstream causes of avoidable human
harm. The story of Flint is about more
than bumbling bureaucrats; Flint is also
the collision point for neglected and de-
liberately hidden forces. Most of the
people who failed the residents of Flint
focusedononenarrowoutcome, such as
finances or water tests, and while some
were negligent or lazy, few thought of
themselves as racists. But the exclusion
from good housing, fair mortgages, and
decent schools meant that the largely
African American population in Flint
did not have the assets to move on when
GM did. The abandonment of Flint
might not have been consciously racist,
but as the Michigan Civil Rights Com-
mission comments in its report on Flint,
“colorblindness is racism.” And as the
filmmaker Michael Moore noted, this
would not have occurred in the wealthi-
er and predominantly white Michigan
cities ofWest Bloomfield,Grosse Pointe,
or Ann Arbor.
As Clark reports, Michigan has a cul-
ture where “secrecy [runs] deep.” Public
access to government data is technically
difficult, and taxpayers often are told
to pay for access to publicly funded
health and environment data. Michigan
ranked “dead last” of all the states in the
2015 State Integrity report card from the
Center for Public Integrity, with partic-
ularly low marks for access to informa-
tion, Clark adds. Openness was an “at
will gesture,” Clark notes, and high-
ranking officials had legal immunity
for decisions, while those in the lower
ranks could be charged with gross neg-
ligence for decisions of far less impor-
tance. I find that when administrative
structures demand that their staff mem-
bers focus narrowly and are told to “stay
in your lane,” the big problems get ne-
glected.
Students, elected officials, historians,
andhealthprofessionals can learnmuch
from Mona Hanna-Attisha’s What the
Eyes Don’t See and Anna Clark’s The Poi-
sonedCity.More to thepoint, policy lead-
ers need to learn from Hanna-Attisha’s
experiences, and clinicians need to
learn from Clark just how much of the
illness that presents before them is driv-
en by seemingly remote, but destructive,
policy decisions. ▪
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